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ARTICLES
THE ROLE OF ACTUAL CONFUSION
EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION*
MICHAEL J. ALLEN"
In deciding the issue of trademark' infringement, courts must
determine, among other things,2 whether the defendant's use of
his trademark is likely to cause confusion among the consuming
public as to the source of the goods on which the mark is used. In
analyzing this issue the courts consider a number of factors.3
* Based on an article which appeared at 83 TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1993).
** Michael J. Allen (B.A. Westminster College; J.D. University of Notre
Dame Law School), is a director with the law firm of Carruthers & Roth, P.A. in
Greensboro, North Carolina, where he concentrates his practice in intellectual
property law and commercial litigation. Copyright © 1993 by Michael J. Allen,
all rights reserved. The views expressed in this article are strictly those of the
author.
1. Unless stated otherwise, the term trademark as used in this article
includes common law trademarks and trade dresses protected under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act as well as federally registered trademarks. "'Trade
dress' involves the total image of a product and may include features such as
size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular
sales techniques." John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980
(11th Cir. 1983). See also Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d
837, 841 (9th Cir. 1987); Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346,
348 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78,
80 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982).
2. In order for a plaintiff to prove federal trademark infringement, he must
show that he possesses a valid, protectable trademark and that the defendant's
use of a similar trademark is likely to cause confusion among the consuming
public.
3. In determining whether or not a likelihood of confusion exists, courts
normally consider the following factors: (1) the strength of the plaintiffs
trademark; (2) the similarity of the parties' trademarks; (3) the similarity of the
parties' products; (4) the similarity of the retail outlets for the products; (5) the
similarity of advertising media utilized by the parties; (6) the defendant's intent
1
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Among these is "actual confusion", that is, whether or not there
has been any reported instances of individuals who have actually
been confused as to the source of the defendant's products because
of the similarity between the parties' trademarks.
While most courts agree that actual confusion is one of the
most important factors, if not the most important factor, consid-
ered in determining the likelihood of confusion, they have dis-
played inconsistency in determining what evidence is considered
probative, substantial evidence of actual confusion. This problem
has been exacerbated by the failure of some courts to describe
fully the evidence being considered on this issue and to explain
why they find such evidence to be either probative or non-proba-
tive of actual confusion.
This article seeks to provide an overall discussion of the role
of actual confusion evidence in federal trademark infringement
actions and to reconcile the differences among the courts as to the
value given to various types of actual confusion evidence. Section
I discusses the effect of the existence or absence of actual confu-
sion evidence in infringement actions, and the relative importance
which the courts place on such evidence. Section II discusses the
various types of evidence which trademark infringement plaintiffs
have proffered in attempting to prove the existence of actual con-
fusion, and the weight which the courts have given to these types
of evidence. This section also discusses whose confusion (e.g., con-
sumers, suppliers, competitors) is relevant to and probative of
actual confusion, and how much evidence of actual confusion is
necessary to have this factor support a finding of a likelihood of
confusion. Finally, Section III discusses the evidentiary problems,
such as hearsay and other concerns, encountered by those
attempting to introduce evidence of actual confusion.
I. THE VALUE AND EFFECT OF ACTUAL CONFUSION EVIDENCE
A. The Presence of Actual Confusion Evidence
Probative evidence of actual confusion is, without question,
highly relevant to the issue of whether confusion between two
in adopting his mark; (7) the existence of actual confusion; and (8) the degree of
care exercised by purchasers in making their purchasing decision. See, e.g., Blue
Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 863 F.2d 1253, 1260 (5th Cir. 1989); Centaur
Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1225 (2d
Cir. 1987); Plus Products v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1004 (2d
Cir. 1983); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §§ 729-31 (1938).
[Vol. 16:19
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trademarks is likely. While courts recognize the difficulty of
obtaining evidence of actual confusion 4 and therefore generally do
not require such evidence in order to find a likelihood of confu-
sion,5 a plaintiff able to proffer credible evidence of actual confu-
sion has gone a long way in proving likely confusion. The courts
have used various language to characterize the importance of
actual confusion evidence to the likelihood of confusion issue;
some have called it the "best evidence,"6 while others have termed
it the "strongest evidence,"7 of the existence of a likelihood of
confusion.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has gone even further, inti-
mating that the presence of credible actual confusion evidence cre-
ates an inference that a likelihood of confusion exists:
There can be no more positive or substantial proof of the likelihood
of confusion than proof of actual confusion. Moreover, reason tells
us that while very little proof of actual confusion would be neces-
4. See, e.g., Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, 750 F.2d 903, 914 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir. 1979); W.E.
Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 662 (2d Cir. 1970); Tisch Hotels, Inc. v.
Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1965); Earth Technology Corp. v.
Environmental Research & Technology, Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 585, 589 (C.D.
Cal. 1983).
5. See, e.g., International Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc.,
846 F.2d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir. 1988); E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int'l
Imports, 756 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1985); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599
F.2d at 353; W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d at 662; Harold F. Ritchie,
Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 761-62 (2d Cir. 1960); Earth
Technology Corp. v. Environmental Research and Technology, Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 589.
6. See, e.g., Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 813
(5th Cir. 1989); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Inc., 828 F.2d 1482, 1487
(10th Cir. 1987); Freedom Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1185 (11th
Cir. 1985); E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Intl Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d at
1529; AmStar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531
F.2d 366, 383 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Worthington
Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F. Supp. 1417, 1443 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
7. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 521 (10th Cir.
1987); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Products, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555, 561
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc.,
675 F.2d 1160, 1166 (11th Cir. 1982) (the presence of actual confusion is
"[plerhaps the most important single factor" in determining likelihood of
confusion).
1994]
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sary to prove the likelihood of confusion, an almost overwhelming
amount of proof would be necessary to refute such proof.'
Other courts have followed the Fifth Circuit's language in discuss-
ing the effect of the existence of actual confusion on the likelihood
of confusion issue. 9 Courts are justified in giving great weight to
credible evidence of actual confusion, for if substantial confusion
as a result of the similarity of the parties' trademarks has already
occurred, it usually illustrates that future confusion is likely.10
B. Actual Confusion Evidence and "Secondary Meaning"
Evidence of actual confusion also is relevant to the issue of
whether a plaintiff's descriptive trademark has acquired "secon-
dary meaning" and therefore is protectable. As one leading com-
mentator has stated, "[e]vidence of actual confusion is strong
evidence of secondary meaning."" This statement is logical, since
those confused must necessarily associate the plaintiffs trade-
mark with the plaintiff in order for actual confusion to exist:
It must be recognized that secondary meaning and likelihood of
buyer confusion, although two separate legal issues, will be diffi-
cult to distinguish in viewing the evidence. That is, if buyers are
confused, then this also means that they must have recognized
plaintiff's word as a trademark and associated it only with
plaintiff.
12
While few courts have discussed the issue of actual confusion
as evidence of secondary meaning, those that have done so have
given weight to such evidence. For example, in International Ken-
8. World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482,
489 (5th Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted).
9. E.g., International Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846
F.2d 1079, 1089 (7th Cir. 1988); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji
Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1985); Yankelovich, Skelly and
White, Inc. v. White, Yankelovich, Skelly Consulting Group, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1384, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); American Ass'n for the Advancement of
Science v. Hearst Corp., 498 F. Supp. 244, 258 (D.D.C. 1980).
10. In fact, some courts have concluded that a trial court cannot summarily
reject evidence of actual confusion based upon its own conclusion from a side-by-
side analysis that confusion is unlikely. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Morton Foods, Inc.,
316 F.2d 298, 301 (10th Cir. 1963); Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-
Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 761-62 (2d Cir. 1960).
11. 1 J. THoMAs McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15.12,
at 15-55 (3d ed. 1992).
12. 1 id. § 15.3 at 15-20.
[Vol. 16:19
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nel Club v. Mighty Star, Inc.,13 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals stated as follows:
As evidence of secondary meaning, the International Kennel Club
also introduced evidence that the club received a number and a
variety of letters and phone calls asking about the defendants' toy
dogs. In A.J. Canfield, the court found similar evidence -letters
and phone calls to Canfield "all searching for the elusive diet choc-
olate fudge drink" (after a competitor advertised its own "Choco-
late Fudge" drink) - "sufficient to show that when consumers
think of diet chocolate fudge soda they think of Canfield." Like-
wise, the correspondence directed to the plaintiff provides support
for the inference that when dog fanciers see the "International
Kennel Club" name, they think of the plaintiff.'4
Thus, credible evidence of actual confusion is not only extremely
helpful in proving a likelihood of confusion, it is also helpful in
establishing that the plaintiffs trademark has acquired secondary
meaning.' 5
C. The Absence of Actual Confusion Evidence
Just as the courts have considered the impact of the existence
of actual confusion evidence, they have also considered the effect
of a lack of actual confusion evidence on a plaintiffs ability to
prove infringement. As noted above, courts generally acknowl-
edge that a plaintiff need not prove actual confusion in order to
establish trademark infringement. 16 This fact is especially true
where the unavailability of such evidence is expected, 17 for exam-
13. 846 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1988).
14. Id. at 1086 (quoting A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d
903, 907 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also American Scientific Chemical, Inc. v. American
Hospital Supply Co., 690 F.2d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 1982) (where court relied upon
instances of actual confusion as an "indicium" of the secondary meaning achieved
in the plaintiffs mark).
15. Some courts have considered actual confusion evidence in making its
secondary meaning determination, but have held that evidence of actual
confusion on the part of a few non-consumers was insufficient by itself to
establish secondary meaning in the plaintiffs trademark. Bank of Texas v.
Commerce Southwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 1984); Norm Thompson
Outfitters, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 448 F.2d 293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1971).
16. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 914
(Fed. Cir. 1984); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir. 1979)
("this factor is weighed heavily [against a likelihood of confusion] only when
there is evidence of past confusion or, perhaps, when the particular
circumstances indicate such evidence should have been available.").
1994]
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ple, tvhere the competing items are low-priced goods usually
purchased on impulse and consumers would not be expected to
complain about purchasing the wrong product,' 8 or where the
defendant's product has been on the market for such a short
period of time that the receipt of reported instances of actual con-
fusion is unlikely.19 In such instances, courts generally treat the
18. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 522 (10th Cir.
1987) (evidence of actual confusion when the products are low priced is more
valuable because consumers are more likely to avoid the brand in the future than
to complain); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805
F.2d 920, 928 (10th Cir. 1986); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982);
Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383 (7th Cir. 1976); Olay
Co. v. Cococare Products, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1028, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Gillette Canada, Inc. v. Ranir Corp., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1768, 1774 (T.T.A.B.
1992); see also Tiffany & Co. v. Classic Motor Carriages Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1835, 1843 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (absence of actual confusion is of no
consequence because "customers might not make inquiry because they simply
assume a connection with opposer"); Bottega Veneta, Inc. v. Volume Shoe Corp.,
226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 964, 971 (T.T.A-B. 1985) ("both the limitation of opposer's
channels [of information] and the natural reluctance of retail purchasers to
admit they've been deceived, materially reduce the likelihood that any confusion
of purchasers would be reported or that evidence of such would be found"); Tony
Lama Co. v. DiStefano, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176, 185 (T.T.A.B. 1980) (absence of
actual confusion evidence is of no consequence "especially where, as here, there is
nothing to suggest that the products of the parties are not well constructed and of
good quality.... ."). But see Old Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's Inc., 961 F.2d 200,
205 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Low price, however, does not necessarily mean that
actual confusion would not be reported.").
19. Nina Ricci S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1901,
1903 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (defendant's goods not yet marketed); Hasbro, Inc. v.
Lanard Toys, 858 F.2d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1988); Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1988) (less than one year); Centaur
Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1219, 1227 (2d
Cir. 1987) (four months); Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Kaye, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1465, 1466-67 (D. Conn. 1991) (where defendant's marked product had not yet
achieved a "mass market and its sales have been largely confined to defendants'
deli restaurant"); Farberware, Inc. v. Mr. Coffee, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103,
1110 (D. Del. 1990) (where defendant only recently began shipping alleged
infringing product); Educational Testing Serv. v. Touchstone Applied Science
Assoc., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (this element is "inapplicable"
because "the defendant's product had not yet entered the stream of commerce.");
Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F. Supp. 1417, 1444 (S.D. Ohio 1990)
(sales only recently began); Kusan, Inc. v. Fairway Siding Corp., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1202, 1209 (D. Mass. 1988) (because defendant's product has been on the
market for less than one year, defendant was not entitled to presumption of lack
of likelihood of confusion based upon no actual confusion evidence); Elizabeth
6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss1/2
ACTUAL CONFUSION EVIDENCE
actual confusion factor as a non-factor, with the absence of such
evidence having no adverse impact on the plaintiffs ability to
prove infringement.20
In other circumstances, however, a plaintiffs failure to intro-
duce evidence of actual confusion will be highly probative of the
unlikelihood of confusion. Indeed, in certain circumstances a
plaintiffs inability to produce credible actual confusion evidence
has created an almost insurmountable inference of no likelihood of
confusion. For example, in Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Preci-
sion v. Polaroid Corp.,21 the First Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the effect of a lack of credible actual confusion evidence
on the plaintiffs ability to prevail. After stating that, "absent evi-
dence of actual confusion, when the marks have been in the mar-
ket, side-by-side, for a substantial period of time, there is a
presumption that there is little likelihood of confusion,"22 the First
Circuit held that the plaintiffs inability to bring forth more than a
"single, feeble and indirect" example of confusion "strongly indi-
cates" that the defendant's use of its mark is not likely to create
confusion.23 Other courts have followed Pignons24 or have other-
wise similarly recognized that a lack of actual confusion evidence
over a substantial period of time creates a presumption or infer-
ence,25 or at least strongly supports a finding,26 that confusion is
unlikely.
Taylor Cosmetics Co. v. Annick Goutal, S.A.R.L., 673 F. Supp. 1238, 1246
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Gillette Canada, Inc. v. Ranir Corp., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1768,
1774 n.13 (T.T.A.B. 1992); Jockey Int'l, Inc. v. Butler, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1607,
1612 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (applicant's sales "were insignificant"); Chemetron Corp. v.
Morris Coupling and Clamp Co., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537, 541 (T.T.A.B. 1979)
(lack of actual confusion evidence is of no consequence where applicant's mark
has been used for one and a half years and there was no evidence of the extent of
sales of applicant's goods bearing the mark).
20. See supra notes 18 and 19.
21. 657 F.2d 482 (1st Cir. 1981).
22. Id. at 490 (quoting 3 ROBERT CALLMANN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 82.3(a) at 849 (3d ed. 1969)).
23. Pignons, 657 F.2d at 491 (four years is a substantial period of time).
24. See, e.g., NEC Elecs., Inc. v. New England Circuit Sales, Inc., 722 F. Supp
861, 865 (D. Mass. 1989) (five years); Greentree Labs., Inc. v. G.G. Bean, Inc.,
718 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (D. Me. 1989) (four years).
25. See, e.g., AmStar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir.
1980) (three instances of actual confusion over fifteen years); McGregor-Doniger,
Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir. 1979); Beneficial Corp. v.
Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F. Supp. 445, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
26. See, e.g., Scotch Whisky Ass'n v. Majestic Distilling Co., 958 F.2d 594, 598
(4th Cir. 1992) (absence of actual confusion after 25 years of use and millions of
1994]
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While a plaintiff's inability to introduce instances of actual
confusion is certainly relevant where both parties' marks have
been before the consuming public's eye in a significant manner for
a substantial period of time, courts should avoid automatically
applying a blanket presumption or inference that confusion is
unlikely. Instead, courts should consider the types of products
and companies involved and whether confused consumers are
likely to make their confusion known, the number of sales of the
trademarked products, the opportunity for confusion to occur, and
other factors relating to the accessibility of such evidence if confu-
sion has occurred. It must be remembered that in many instances
the fact that a plaintiff has not adduced actual confusion evidence
does not necessarily mean that actual confusion has not
occurred.27
dollars of sales is "strongly probative" evidence that confusion is unlikely);
Western Publishing Co. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1990)
(absence of actual confusion evidence despite substantial sales of the defendant's
products over the course of about one year weighs heavily in favor of the
defendant); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Systems, Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987) (lack of actual confusion evidence
despite 17 months of use by the defendant is highly significant); Plus Products v.
Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1983) (absence of actual
confusion evidence "over a three-year period during which substantial sales
occurred, is a strong indicator that the likelihood of confusion is minimal.");
Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 377 (1st Cir. 1980) (absence of
actual confusion evidenced over a three and a half year period is "strongly
probative" of no likelihood of confusion); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold,
Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1230-31 (3d Cir. 1978) (19 misdirected letters and phone
calls in forty years when the defendant sold $50 million of products is
insignificant and supports a finding that confusion is unlikely); S.C. Johnson &
Son, Inc. v. Lever Brothers Co., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027, 1036 (E.D. Wis. 1991)
(absence of actual confusion evidence despite more than 100 million dollars of
sales of products bearing the allegedly infringing mark was "highly persuasive
evidence that confusion is not likely."); Hutchinson v. Essence Communications,
Inc., 769 F. Supp. 541, 556-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
Video Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 808, 816 (D. Kan. 1989) (absence of
actual confusion evidence is important in finding confusion unlikely); Sunnen
Products Co. v. Sunex Int'l, Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1744, 1749-50 (T.T.A.B.
1987) (absence of actual confusion evidence over a five-year period is "highly
significant evidence corroborating applicant's position and our view that
confusion is not likely.")
27. Some courts have recognized that generally the number of instances of
actual confusion in a given case will exceed the number of reported or adduced
instances of actual confusion. See, e.g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531,
1543 (11th Cir. 1986); NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 559 F. Supp.
1337, 1344 (D.D.C. 1983).
[Vol. 16:19
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In instances where the plaintiff seeks a recovery of damages,
its inability to introduce actual confusion evidence may be fatal to
obtaining that remedy. Some courts have held that in order to
recover damages, a plaintiff must show that at least some consum-
ers were actually deceived and that the plaintiff was injured as a
result.28 Other courts have held that proof of a wrongful intent on
the part of the defendant to deceive the consuming public estab-
lishes the plaintiffs right to recover the defendant's profits or its
damages.29
II. EVIDENCE PROBATIVE OF ACTUAL CONFUSION
In contrast to the relative uniformity of court decisions con-
cerning the importance and effect of actual confusion evidence to
the issue of likelihood of confusion are court decisions concerning
what evidence constitutes probative evidence of actual confusion.
While courts generally agree that mistaken purchases are the best
evidence of actual confusion,30 they have not treated other evi-
dence quite so uniformly, such as evidence of misdirected letters
or phone calls3 ' and evidence of inquiries regarding a possible
relationship or affiliation between the two parties or their goods.32
The courts have also been inconsistent in determining whose con-
fusion, other than consumers (whose confusion is uniformly
treated as relevant) is relevant evidence probative of the existence
of actual confusion and, hence, likely confusion. 3 Courts have
also varied in analyzing how much actual confusion evidence must
be introduced in order for this factor to weigh in favor of a conclu-
sion that confusion is likely. 4 Finally, some courts have treated
market survey evidence as evidence of actual confusion even
28. See, e.g., Web Printing Controls Co. v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202, 1205
(7th Cir. 1990); Wordsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244,
1247 n.5 (8th Cir. 1990); Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Trans. Corp., 878 F.2d
650, 655 (2d Cir. 1989); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 525;
Co-Rect Products, Inc. v. Marvy! Advertising Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324,
1329-30 (8th Cir. 1985); Shonac Corp. v. Amko Int'l, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 919, 934
(S.D. Ohio 1991); Miller v. Chisholm, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1376, 1379 (D. Kan.
1991); see also 2 McCARTHY, supra note 11, § 30:25 at 500 n.16.
29. See generally 2 McCARTHY, supra note 11, § 30.25.
30. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 67-87 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 88-114 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
1994]
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though it is limited to responses to the artificially created survey
stimuli.35
While courts have varied in their treatment of these types of
evidence, it is axiomatic that any evidence of actual confusion, to
be entitled to any weight, must be related to the similarity of the
trademarks involved in suit and not to something else. 6 It should
also be noted that given the unlimited factual scenarios in which
alleged instances of actual confusion may occur, it is impossible
and inadvisable to categorize certain groups of evidence as either
clearly probative or not probative without analysis of the specific
facts involved. The only category of evidence which even
approaches justifying uniform treatment as clearly probative is
unambiguous evidence of mistaken purchases made as a result of
the confusing similarity of the parties' trademarks.
A. Mistaken Purchases and Similar Evidence
The best evidence of actual confusion is evidence of individu-
als who have purchased, as a result of similar trademarks, the
product of one of the parties under the mistaken belief that they
are purchasing the other party's product. Courts have found
such evidence to be highly probative of the existence of both actual
and likely confusion.3 8 Other courts have accentuated the great
35. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Lamps R Us, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 340, 346
(T.T.A.B. 1983)("One important defect [of the actual confusion evidence] is that
there is nothing to indicate whether the reason for the question as to affiliation
was the result of the similarity of the marks."); UMC Indus., Inc. v. UMC Elecs.
Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 861, 879 (T.T.A.B. 1980) ('[Tlhe instances of actual
confusion referred to by opposer involve confusion of the corporate identities of
the parties in the financial world rather than confusion arising from applicant's
use of [its mark] .... [T]his is not the type of confusion contemplated under [the
Lanham Act]."); Transamerica Fin. Corp. v. Trans-American Collections, Inc.,
197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 43, 52 (T.T.A.B. 1977); see also 2 McCARTHY, supra note 11,
§ 23.2 at 23-28 ("[Elvidence of actual confusion must be viewed in its evidentiary
context. Confusion may not be causally related to the use of similar marks at
all.").
37. Generally, in trademark infringement cases the concern is that
consumers will mistakenly believe that the defendant's product emanates from
the plaintiff. In certain instances, however, there is a greater concern about the
likelihood of reverse confusion, i.e., where consumers will mistakenly believe
that the plaintiffs product emanates from the defendant. See Michael J. Allen,
Who Must Be Confused and When?: The Scope of Confusion Actionable Under
Federal Trademark Law, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 209, 216-18 (1991).
38. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 521-22 (10th
Cir. 1987); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1543-44 (11th Cir. 1986),
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weight given to such evidence by noting the effect of a lack of it. 3 9
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (four mistaken purchases); Louisiana World
Exposition, Inc. v. Logue, 746 F.2d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 1984) (one mistaken
purchase); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 513 F.2d 366, 384-85 (one
mistaken purchase); Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1975)
(four mistaken purchases); Crain Communications, Inc. v. Fairchild
Publications, Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1214, 1216 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (one
misplaced advertisement in defendant's publication); Varitronics Sys. Inc. v.
Merlin Equip., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1203, 1208-09 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (one mistaken
purchase was "very compelling incident: of actual confusion); Molenaar, Inc. v.
Happy Toys, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 469, 471 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (one mistaken
order).
39. W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 574 (2d Cir.
1993) ("[T]he relevant confusion is that which affects 'the purchasing and selling
of the goods or services in question.'"); Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing Co.,
949 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1991) (where court gave little weight to evidence of
misdirected telephone calls and affiliation inquiries, stating "no evidence links
the confusion evinced by the calls to any potential or actual effects on consumers'
purchasing decisions"); Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Beckman
Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207 (1st Cir. 1983) ("There is no evidence
whatsoever that anyone ever bought a Beckman analyzer thinking it came from
Astra, or that anyone bought Astra products believing that they came from
Beckman."); Telmed Corp. v. Telmed, Inc., 588 F.2d 213, 220 (7th Cir. 1978);
Intricate Metal Prods., Inc. v. Schneider, 324 F.2d 555, 562 (9th Cir. 1963)
(finding no likelihood of confusion where "[t]here is no testimony that anyone
ever bought the accused mechanism mistaking it for [plaintiffs product]");
McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. v. American Aviation Assoc., Inc., 117 F.2d 293, 295
(D.C. Cir. 1940) ("The plaintiff did not show one instance of a newsstand
purchaser receiving the magazine he did not intend to buy"); Taj Mahal Enters.,
Ltd. v. Trump, 745 F. Supp. 240, 250-51 (D.N.J. 1990); Broadcasting
Publications, Inc. v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 309, 318 (S.D. Fla. 1983);
American Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607, 616
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (where court discounted actual confusion evidence, stating "it is
buyer confusion that the Lanham Act addresses."); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.
G. Barry Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 580 F.2d 44 (2d
Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); Fotomat Corp. v.
Photo Drive-Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 693, 701 (D.N.J. 1977) (where court found
plaintiffs "actual confusion" evidence unconvincing, stating, "these customer
affidavits generally fail to indicate that customers have mistakenly made
purchases at Photo Drive-Thru thinking it to be Fotomat; in some cases, the
confusion was dissipated upon seeing the Photo Drive-Thru name, while in
others the confusion was not great enough that the affiants actually made
purchases at Photo Drive-Thru."); Jewel Cos. v. Westhall Co., 413 F. Supp. 994,
999 (N.D. Ohio 1976) ("The strongest confusion would have been that which
resulted in a customer going to Jewel Mart and making a purchase because the
customer thought the store was operated by Jewel Tea. There is no indication at
all that such a situation, or one approximating it, developed."), affd, 575 F.2d
1176 (6th Cir. 1978); Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Allstate Driving School, Inc., 301
F. Supp. 4, 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) ("No one testified at the trial that he enrolled at
11
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As one of these courts has stated, "[w]hen considering evidence of
actual confusion, the key is whether there actually has been a
diversion of customers from plaintiff to defendant."40 The courts
so highly regard this evidence that very little of it is necessary to
establish actual confusion.4 ' The great weight given to such evi-
dence is justified for several reasons besides the general difficulty
of obtaining this evidence. First, while courts disagree as to
whether confusion among non-consumers is relevant, there is no
question that confusion among purchasers at the time of the
purchase is relevant. Second, unlike other types of actual confu-
sion evidence, a proven mistaken purchase leaves little room for
doubt as to whether the person was actually confused. Third, evi-
dence of mistaken purchases usually is introduced through the
testimony of the confused purchaser, so that the form of the evi-
dence also leaves little or no room for ambiguity as to its
substance.
There are other types of evidence which, while perhaps not so
clearly probative of actual confusion as mistaken purchases, are
nevertheless sufficiently clear that courts generally credit them as
being probative of the existence of actual confusion. This evidence
includes such things as complaints made or sent to the plaintiff
about the defendant's trademarked product 4 2 and requests made
to the plaintiff for purchases of or information regarding the
defendant's product.4 3 Likewise, returns of the defendant's prod-
ucts to the plaintiff for repair or refund have been considered cred-
Driving School because he was under the impression that it was operated or
sponsored by plaintiff. . . ."); see also Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, 863 F.2d
1253, 1260 n.9 (5th Cir. 1989); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prod. Co., 791
F.2d 423, 429 n.6 (5th Cir. 1986); Source Serv. Corp. v. Source Telecomputing
Corp., 635 F. Supp. 600, 614 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
40. Taj Mahal Enters., Ltd. v. Trump., 745 F. Supp. 240, 249 (D.N.J. 1990).
41. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d at 383-84;
Savin Corp. v. National Tower Warehouse, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 636, 640-42 (N.D.
Ga. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 489 (D. Neb.
1981); Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau, Inc.,
220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 282, 297 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
43. See, e.g., International Kennel Club, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d at
1090 (7th Cir. 1988); The Comic Strip, Inc. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1608, 1612 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); American Ass'n for the
Advancement of Science v. Hearst Corp.; 498 F. Supp. 244, 258-59 (D.D.C. 1980).
Cf. Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Creative House Promotions,
Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1991) (telephone calls by members of plaintiff
who mistakenly believed that an award marketed by defendant and bestowed on
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ible evidence of actual confusion.44 Some courts have also treated
as probative of actual confusion instances where a plaintiff was
sued and/or served with legal complaints where the defendant was
actually the party intended to be sued.45
Generally, these various types of confusion evidence are con-
sidered credible and probative for the same reasons as evidence of
mistaken purchases. With each, the "confused" party takes some
affirmative action (often to the confused party's detriment or
inconvenience) which illustrates his confusion. In other words, if
he were not confused, he would not have taken the action he did.
As a result, the form or circumstances of these incidents do not
lend themselves to much speculation that there is any reason that
they occurred other than because of a confusing similarity
between the parties' marks. As discussed below, these types of
actual confusion evidence do not represent an exhaustive list of
evidence which has been found probative of actual and likely con-
fusion; they have been discussed in this section because courts
have more uniformly regarded them as credible, probative evi-
dence of actual confusion.
an actors workshop, pictured in a Daily Variety photograph, was actually an
Oscar).
44. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 297
(3d Cir. 1991); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d at 521-22; Harold F.
Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d at 761-62; Gemveto Jewelry
Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1052, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Savin Corp. v.
National Tower Warehouse, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 636, 641 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Dr. Ing.
H.C.F. Porsche AG v. Zim, 481 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 (N.D. Tex. 1979); see also
Harlequin Enters. Ltd. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946, 949 (2d Cir. 1981)
(retailers' return of large numbers of the defendant's books to the plaintiff);
Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1331 (7th Cir.
1977) (retailers sending the defendant's coupons to the plaintiff for redemption),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); Glamorene Products Corp. v. Boyle-Midway,
Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145, 158-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (retailers sending the
defendant's coupons to the plaintiff for redemption); Jockey Int'l, Inc. v. Burkard,
185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 201, 205 (S.D. Cal 1975) (letter from retailer to the plaintiff
requesting reimbursement for advertisement of the defendant's product). But
see Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220, 1231
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
45. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 719, 723 (D. Md. 1989),
rev'd on other grounds, 915 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1990); Schering Corp. v. Shering
A.G., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1603-04 (D.N.J. 1987); Santucci Construction Co.
v. Carlo V. Santucci, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 783, 787 (N.D. Il1. 1978).
1994]
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B. Misdirected Communications
Courts have been quite inconsistent in their treatment of mis-
directed communications as evidence of actual confusion. This
category of actual confusion evidence generally refers to corre-
spondence and telephone calls mistakenly directed to one party
even though actually intended for receipt by the other party. This
judicial variance can be explained in part by the nature of the evi-
dence itself. Often, it is difficult or even impossible to determine
the precise reasons the letters or calls were misdirected; that is,
often there is no way for the parties or court to confirm that the
misdirection resulted from the sender's confusion of the two
marks in question. Without any method of verification, a court is
essentially forced to read minds in determining whether there was
any confusion at all on the part of the senders and whether it was
caused by a similarity of the parties' marks.
There may be other reasons for the misdirection aside from
confusion of the parties' marks. For example, if a person making a
telephone call attempts to get the plaintiffs telephone number
from directory assistance and the operator hastily provides him
with the phone number of a similarly-named company, the caller
has experienced no confusion.4" On the other hand, in other cir-
cumstances misdirected letters and telephone calls can be persua-
sive evidence of the existence of actual consumer confusion. For
example, it may be difficult to explain away as mere carelessness
misdirected letters or phone calls where the trademarks in ques-
tion do not comprise the parties' business names or mailing
addresses. In such instances, the "blame" for the misdirection
cannot be placed on a directory assistance operator or the sloppy
use of an address directory or telephone book. The trademark
must be mistakenly associated with the wrong party in order for
misdirections to occur. This faulty connection (or confusion) most
likely occurs at least partially in the sender's mind, and not as a
result of some extraneous occurrence unrelated to the sender's
thought process.
Some courts have found evidence of misdirected mail or phone
calls to be probative of actual confusion where such evidence was
the primary or only evidence introduced on this issue.47 Other
46. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1160
(5th Cir. 1982); Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 725 F. Supp. 790, 797
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (where two customers had returned plaintiffs defective slippers
to defendant and one customer had complained to defendant about plaintiffs
[Vol..16:19
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courts have given such evidence weight where the plaintiff also
introduced other forms of credible, probative actual confusion evi-
dence. 48 At least one other court appears to have treated a misdi-
product, the court stated that "[m]isdirected orders and correspondence have
been held to evidence actual confusion that is worthy of consideration.");
Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc. 717 F. Supp. 96, 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (where there was one misdirected order, court said that "this
misdirected order evidences some actual confusion that is worthy of
consideration."); Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc. v. White, Yankelovich, Skelly
Consulting Group, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(misdirection of telex, misdirection of letter to plaintiffs about services performed
by defendants, and misdirection of checks received by plaintiffs in payment for
services rendered by defendants were "convincing instances of actual
confusion."); Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Seidenburg, 619 F. Supp. 1173, 1184
(W.D. La. 1985) (where two of plaintiffs long-term customers telephoned
defendant in order to make a purchase and where' the post office and UPS have
confused the parties); IMS Ltd. v. International Medical Sys., Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1268, 1274-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (one misdirected request for a price
quotation and a mistaken phone call to defendant for plaintiff by nurse
conducting a study was "persuasive proof of the likelihood of future confusion.");
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Constr. Co., 619 F. Supp. 710, 712-13 (D. Ariz.
1985) (two telephone calls to plaintiff requesting defendant's phone number
constituted some evidence of actual confusion); Mustang Motels, Inc. v. Patel,
226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 526, 527 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (telephone calls to plaintiff
requesting reservation and rate information about defendant's motel); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Sears Fin. Network, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 857, 861-62 (D.D.C.
1983) (where defendant conceded that actual confusion had occurred, "citing as
an example a telephone operator who gave one of its customers the number of
Sears, Roebuck and Co."); Quill Corp. v. Quill Printing Corp., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
986, 988-89 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (where defendant had received telephone calls from
people who mistakenly believed that they were calling plaintiff); Purofied Down
Products Corp. v. Puro Down Int'l Corp., 530 F. Supp. 134, 135 n.2 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (where a proposed contract for repairs to equipment was sent to the
attention of defendant's president but was mistakenly addressed to plaintiff);
Lambda Elecs. Corp. v. Lambda Technology, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 915, 927
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (where court rejected defendant's argument that misdirected
checks and orders were mere clerical errors, and stated that such evidence was
"sufficient to show actual confusion."); Citibank, N.A. v. City Bank of San
Francisco, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 997, 1006, 1009 (N.D. Cal 1980) (where four
packages, more than 41 checks and numerous telephone calls intended for
defendant have reached plaintiff); Technicon Co. v. Erickson Tool Co., 116
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 98-99 (Comm'r Pat. & Trademarks 1958) (where opposer had
received requests for information regarding defendant's "Techni-Freeze"
refrigerating unit, such evidence, while "by no means conclusive," was "entitled
to consideration as an indication of probable confusion.").
48. See, e.g., Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner, 930 F.2d 1056, 1064 (3d Cir.
1991); First Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1394, 1396 (8th Cir. 1991); International Kennel Club, Inc. v.
1994]
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rected letter as good evidence of actual confusion, but found that
the overall amount of actual confusion evidence presented was too
small to be significant.49
In other cases, however, courts have refused to recognize mis-
directed communications as credible evidence that actual confu-
sion has occurred between the parties' trademarks. Many of these
courts have based their refusal to credit such evidence on their
belief, or evidence illustrating, that the so-called confusion was
due to confusion or carelessness on the part of a telephone opera-
tor or the postal service.50 In other cases, courts have blamed the
"confusion" on the "mere carelessness" of secretaries or others
mistakenly mailing items to the wrong party.51 Yet other courts
have stated, without explanation, that evidence of misdirected
Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir. 1988); Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1167 (11th Cir. 1982) (one
misdirected dunning letter); NLC, Inc. v. Lenco Elecs., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1419,
1426 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (misdirected mail, checks and facsimile transmissions, as
well as evidence of a supplier's irritation with the plaintiff for failure to pay a bill
belonging to the defendant); Transfer Print Foils, Inc. v. Transfer Print America,
Inc., 720 F. Supp. 425, 431, 439 (D. N.J. 1989) (misdirected checks and purchase
orders); Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 719, 723 (D. Md. 1989);
Santucci Constr. Co. v. Carlo v. Santucci, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 786-87 (N.D.
Ill. 1978); Armstrong Cork Co. v. Armstrong Plastic Covers Co., 434 F. Supp. 860,
868 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (misdirected telephone calls and complaints misdirected to
plaintiff by local better business bureau); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Prudential Title
Co., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 617, 620 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (misdirected mail, personal
visitors and telephone calls where the parties had offices in adjacent buildings).
49. AmStar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 n.10 (5th Cir.
1980).
50. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Princeton Pharmaceutical, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1447, 1449, 1452-53 (S.D. Fla. 1990); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Comstock
Partners, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1029, 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Inc. Publishing Corp. v.
Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 388-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Markel v.
Scovill Mfg. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Allstate Inv. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 25, 29 (W.D. La. 1962), aff'd, 328 F.2d 608 (5th
Cir. 1964). See also Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing Co., 949 F.2d 576, 583
(2d Cir. 1991) (misdirected telephone calls ceased after defendant obtained
listing in local phone books, "likely indicating that the confusion resulted from
the absence of any listing for [defendant's magazine].").
51. McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Comstock Partners, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1029, 1035
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220,
1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afftd, 580 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1978)(per curiam), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); United States Blind Stitch Machine Corp. v. Union
Special Machine Co., 287 F. Supp. 468, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Polaroid Corp. v.
Polarad Elecs. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 350, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), affd on other
grounds, 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
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correspondence is weak evidence of actual confusion and, standing
alone, is insufficient to establish this factor in the plaintiffs
favor.5 2 In most of these decisions, it appears from the opinions
that the plaintiffs failed to explain the exact nature of the misdi-
rected correspondence or, if an explanation was given, it was
unsatisfactory in terms of showing actual confusion on the part of
the sender.
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to summarize and
assess neatly the value of misdirected communications in view of
the varying weight courts have afforded such evidence. There are
three main reasons for this. First, courts have varied as to their
definitions of misdirected communications.5 3 Second, many courts
have credited or discredited such evidence without delineating in
their opinions the specific nature of the misdirected mail or tele-
phone calls in question.54 Third, as with most evidentiary issues,
it is difficult to categorize this evidence, for it is important to ana-
lyze its probativeness and credibility within its specific factual
context.
Given variations in the treatment of misdirected correspon-
dence, can the various court holdings be synthesized? To a certain
extent, they can. If a plaintiff has obtained evidence of misdi-
rected communications, he should do everything possible to prove
to the court's satisfaction that the misdirection resulted from con-
fusion or mistake on the part of some consumer/sender instead of
the postal service or a telephone operator. A plaintiff able to do so
52. Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 606 (9th Cir.
1987) ("the instances of confusion, at best, were thin, and at worst, were
trivial."); Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d at
489-90 (1st Cir. 1981); Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616
F.2d 440, 445 (9th Cir. 1980); Everest & Jennings, Inc. v. E & J Mfg. Co., 263
F.2d 254, 260 (9th Cir. 1958); Nikon, Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 803 F. Supp. 910, 921
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Isolated instances of misdirected mail are inconsequential.");
American Int'l Group, Inc. v. American Intl Airways, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1933, 1936 (E.D. Pa. 1989); B.D. Communications, Inc. v. Dial Media, Inc., 429 F.
Supp. 1011, 1014 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. v. International
Restaurant Group, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 698, 707 (M.D. La. 1975). Court decisions
discussing the insufficiency of such evidence in terms of the amount necessary to
show actual confusion are discussed infra at notes 116 to 126 and accompanying
text.
53. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text and infra notes 55-57 and
accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 719, 723 (D. Md.
1989), rev'd on other grounds, 915 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1990).
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leaves less room for doubt or for a court's unfavorable assumption
as to who, if anyone, was actually confused.
The decisions bear out that such an explanation is important
to ensure that a court credits such evidence. With only a few
exceptions," in the cases in which courts have credited misdi-
rected communications as probative of actual confusion,56 it was
clear that the misdirection resulted from some confusion on the
part of the sender and not someone else. In contrast, those courts
refusing to give much weight to misdirected communications
appear to have done so because either (1) the evidence demon-
strated that the misdirection was caused by something other than
confusion on the part of the consumer/sender or (2) there was
either no evidence or inadequate evidence that the misdirection
was caused by a confused consumer/sender.
A good example of the costly consequences of a failure to pro-
vide such an explanation is found in Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.
G. Barry Corp.57 There, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judg-
ment that its use of the mark "mushroom" for its casual footwear
did not infringe the defendant's "mushroom" trademark used in
connection with its misses sportswear. The defendant counter-
claimed for trademark infringement. In an attempt to prove
actual confusion, the defendant introduced "over a dozen
instances of misdirected invoices, checks, [and] return slips from
retail stores...." 8 In finding the evidence to be of limited proba-
tive value, the district court specifically noted the defendant's fail-
ure to explain the cause of the misdirections:
These instances indicate some kind of confusion on the part of
employees of the retailers, but the testimony of the persons was
not obtained and no explanation was offered for the errors. In
some instances it is obvious they were the result of carelessness or
inefficiency on the part of employees of the retailers.5 9
55. Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Seidenburg, 619 F. Supp. 1173, 1184 (W.D.
La. 1985); Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Sears Fin. Network, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 857,
861-62 (D.D.C. 1983); Citibank, N.A. v. City Bank of San Francisco, 206 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 997, 1006, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Prudential Title
Co., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 617, 619-20 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
56. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
57. 441 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), af'd, 580 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
58. 441 F. Supp. at 1231.
59. Id.
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The district court found that while the misdirections "may have
some probative value, they are far from compelling,"60 and held
that confusion was unlikely.
On appeal, the defendant asserted, inter alia, that the trial
court's treatment of the misdirected communications was clearly
erroneous. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's holding and rejected the plaintiffs argument:
the district court quite properly noted that not a single instance of
consumer confusion was actually demonstrated in the trial record.
There was some evidence of clerical errors and joint advertising
involving the two companies' products, but in the absence of any
testimony to explain these events, the court was clearly entitled to
find that they did not demonstrate actual confusion among retail
customers. In any event, the instances cited by Barry are clearly
de minimis in light of the sales histories of the parties.6 1
As the Mushroom Makers case illustrates, a trademark infringe-
ment plaintiffs failure to explain that the sender's confusion of
the parties' marks caused the misdirections can be extremely
costly and may render the evidence of little value.
Undoubtedly, it will be impossible always to show that misdi-
rections were caused by sender confusion and not by some other
reason. The best example of this inability is the misdirected tele-
phone call, where there generally is no way for a plaintiff to obtain
the reason for the misdirection unless that caller is asked why he
called the plaintiff at the time of the call.6 2 Even if the plaintiffs
employees have the presence of mind to ask this question, and
even if the caller answers it truthfully, a defendant may raise
objections to the introduction of such evidence if the caller himself
is not produced.63 Nevertheless, a plaintiff should make every
effort to offer a factual explanation to the court that the misdi-
rected communications resulted from the caller's/sender's confu-
sion of the two marks involved.
There also may be certain instances where a plaintiff may
hesitate to question senders of misdirected communications
because he fears that the explanation will be unfavorable to his
60. Id.
61. Mushroom Makers, 580 F.2d at 48.
62. In contrast to telephone calls, most misdirected mailings will contain at
least a return address, if not the name of the individual sender, so that either
party willing to do so can at least attempt to verify the precise cause of the
misdirection.
63. Admissibility and other evidentiary concerns are discussed infra at notes
132-36 and accompanying text.
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case. In such instances, a plaintiff may decide that he is better off
not offering any explanation, because to do so would make clear
that confusion of the marks did not cause the misdirection. Such a
plaintiff should be well aware of the risk that he is taking, for, as
discussed above, some courts will treat equally unfavorably unex-
plained misdirections and misdirections caused by someone other
than the consumer/sender.
Some courts also have considered whether "misspellings" con-
stitute probative evidence of actual confusion. In a few cases,
plaintiffs have tried to show the existence of actual confusion
between two similar trademarks by showing that people will spell
the defendant's mark when referring to the plaintiffs mark, or
vice versa. One such case is Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Preci-
sion v. Polaroid Corp. 4 There, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's use of the mark "Alpha" on a series of cameras
infringed its trademark "Alpa" used on a camera. In support of its
case, the plaintiff introduced several registration cards and a let-
ter wherein the "Alpa" product was referred to as "Alpha." The
plaintiff also introduced other evidence where its "Alpa" camera
was referred to as "Alpha." The First Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected all of this evidence as being mere misspellings of the
plaintiffs trademark, noting that such misspellings occurred both
before and after the defendant started using its "Alpha" mark:
Beyond demonstrating what is obvious - that "Alpa" is "Alpha"
minus an "h" - this evidence demonstrates only that for over 20
years Pignons' trademark has been subject to misspelling. There
is nothing in the cards or letters to suggest confusion of products
or businesses. Pignons also cites misspellings of its trademark in
advertisements, catalogs, magazines and newspapers, but again
these evince not product confusion but, at most, that the two
words are very close (or, at least, that some people spell badly).65
The Pignons decision illustrates yet again the potentially fatal
nature of the plaintiff's failure to satisfy the court that the prof-
fered evidence was the result of confusion between the parties'
trademarks. At least one court has followed Pignons in holding
that the alleged instances of actual confusion between the parties'
marks were mere misspellings. 6
64. 657 F.2d 482 (1st Cir. 1981).
65. Id. at 489.
66. Greentree Labs., Inc. v. G. G. Bean, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (D. Me.
1989) (where plaintiff received some letters requesting ODOR KLEEN or
ODORKLEEN (the defendant's mark), rather than ODOKLEEN, the plaintiff's
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C. Inquiries as to Affiliation or Relationship
Courts also have varied in their treatment of evidence of
inquiries made to one of the parties regarding whether or not it is
affiliated with, related to or sponsored by the other party.6 7 When
discussing inquiries as evidence of actual confusion, it is impor-
tant to distinguish affiliation inquiries from consumer inquiries
regarding one party's product or service which are misdirected to
the other based upon the mistaken impression that that product
or service emanates from that party. This latter type of inquiry is
generally regarded as credible, probative evidence of actual confu-
sion.6 8 This section discusses the value assigned by courts to the
former type of inquiry. Usually, such inquiries take the form of a
consumer or someone else asking, "Say, Federal Bank, are you the
same company as, or related to, Federal Finance?"
Many courts have found such affiliation inquiries to be proba-
tive of the existence of actual confusion.69 Unfortunately, most
mark). But see Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG v. Zim, 481 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 (N.D.
Tex. 1979) (where court appeared to give some credit to misspellings as evidence
of actual confusion: "[The defendant] testified that he had had 'problems with
people' about the spelling of his company's name. This problem has carried over
to Por-sha's suppliers, who spell Por-sha's name in at least 16 different ways,
many of which are direct variations of plaintiffs name.").
67. Confusion as to affiliation, relationship, sponsorship or approval is
actionable under federal trademark law. See generally Allen, supra note 37, at
214-16.
68. See, e.g., Harlequin Enters. Ltd. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946,
949 (2d Cir. 1981); Transfer Print Foils, Inc. v. Transfer Print America, Inc., 720
F. Supp. 425, 431 (D.N.J. 1989); Schering Corp. v. Schering A.G., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1596, 1603 (D.N.J. 1987).
69. Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner, 930 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1991);
International Kennel Club v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir.
1988); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 845 (9th Cir.
1987); Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 844 (11th Cir. 1983),
affg 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170, 177 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Fuji Photo Film Co. v.
Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1985); Armco,
Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1982); Donsco,
Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 605 (3d Cir. 1978); Breakers of Palm Beach,
Inc. v. International Beach Hotel Development, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 1576, 1580-81,
1586 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Multi-Local Media Corp. v. 800 Yellow Book Inc., 813 F.
Supp. 199, 204-05 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); National Rural Elec. Coop. Ass'n v. National
Agricultural Chem. Ass'n, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294 (D.D.C. 1992); Olay Co. v.
Cococare Prods., Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1028, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Steinway
& Sons v. Robert DeMars & Friends, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 954, 966 (C.D. Cal.
1981); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chucklebery Publishing, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414,
427 and n. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Prods., Inc.,
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courts have credited such evidence without explanation. How-
ever, the rationale for crediting such evidence is understandable.
If, based upon a similarity between the parties' trademarks, indi-
viduals ask one party whether it is affiliated with or related to the
other party, these individuals are at least sufficiently confused to
believe that some relationship between the parties may exist.
That is, if they go to the trouble of asking whether the parties are
related or affiliated, there must be at least some doubt in their
mind that the parties are separate entities.
Other courts have given little or no weight to affiliation
inquiries as evidence of actual confusion. While some of these
courts have rejected such evidence without explanation,7 ° many
have stated that affiliation inquiries not only do little to prove
actual confusion, but they in fact illustrate that the inquirers are
not confused.71 As one of these courts has stated, "[fMar from
revealing such confusion, [the inquiries and other] statements
indicate that these customers, at least, had the difference in
source clearly in mind."72 Other courts have cited the plaintiffs
failure to prove that confusion between the parties' marks caused
the inquiries in giving little weight to such evidence.73
451 F. Supp. 555, 561 (S.D.N.Y 1978); Armstrong Cork Co. v. Armstrong Plastic
Covers Co., 434 F. Supp. 860, 868, 871 (E.D. Mo. 1977); Kroger Co. v. Superx,
Inc., 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 245, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1976); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper
Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 321-22 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer. v.
Prudential Title Co., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 617, 619-20 (S.D. Tex. 1976); First Intl
Services Corp. v. Chuckles, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1628, 1634 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
70. See, e.g., Elizabeth Taylor Cosmetics Co. v. Annick Goutal, S.A.R.L., 673
F. Supp. 1238, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Electronic Water Conditioners, Inc. v.
Turbomag Corp., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 162, 164 (T.T.A.B. 1984); Toys "R" Us, Inc.
v. Lamps R Us, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 340, 346 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
71. See, e.g., Miss World (UK) Ltd. v. Miss America Pageants, Inc., 856 F.2d
1445, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d
1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1987); Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc.,
626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980); Gruner + Jahr USA Publishing v. Meredith
Corp., 793 F. Supp. 1222, 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Taj Mahal Enters., Ltd. v.
Trump, 745 F. Supp. 240, 250-51 (D.N.J. 1990); Pump, Inc. v. Collins
Management, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 1159, 1169 (D. Mass. 1990); Inc. Publishing
Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Programmed Tax Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 439 F. Supp. 1128, 1130-32
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
72. Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir.
1980).
73. See, e.g., Inc. Publishing Co. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp.
370, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Lamps R Us, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
340, 346 (T.T.A-B. 1983); Transamerica Financial Corp. v. Trans-American
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Professor McCarthy has recommended an apparent middle
ground with respect to the weight given to affiliation inquiries:
"The better view would seem to be that while inquiry evidence is
admissible and relevant, standing alone with no other evidence it
is insufficient proof of actual confusion. Such enquiries alone
reveal a less than totally 'confused' state of mind of the enquiring
persons."74 Some of the courts giving no weight to affiliation
inquiries have relied on this language,7 and one has quoted it but
gone beyond Professor McCarthy's "better view," stating, "[w]e
hold that even when combined with other evidence inquiries to the
plaintiff about the source of a product are of comparatively little
value."76
. Is Professor McCarthy's the better view? In some instances
yes, and in some instances no. While it may be true that in some
cases the affiliation inquiries illustrate a less than "totally" con-
fused state of mind, they nevertheless illustrate a degree of confu-
sion sufficiently serious to cause the inquirers to ask whether the
parties or their branded products or services are somehow related.
Moreover, this view and the view taken by those courts rejecting
such evidence are apparently based upon the premise that all
instances of confusion which have occurred have been introduced
into evidence, and no other "confused" individuals exist. For
example, in Pump, Inc. v. Collins Management, Inc. ," the court
rejected four affiliation inquiries as revealing a less than totally
confused states of mind and further stated, "[c]rucially, [plaintiff's
president] himself alleviated any confusion by informing [the
inquirers] that there was no connection between the bands."78
While the author does not quarrel with the court's holding in that
Collections, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 43, 52 (T.T.A.B. 1977); see also Chicago
Corp. v. North American Chicago Corp., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1715, 1717
(T.T.A.B. 1991) (where the Board found inquiries tended to show actual
confusion, but found that opposer had failed to show the reason for the inquiries
and that other factors supported finding that confusion was likely independent of
the inquiry evidence).
74. 2 McCARTHY, supra note 11, § 23.02[2][d] at 23-32 and 33 (footnote
omitted).
75. Taj Mahal Enters., Ltd. v. Trump, 745 F. Supp. 240, 251 (D.N.J. 1990);
Pump, Inc. v. Collins Management, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 1159, 1169 (D. Mass.
1990).
76. Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir.
1987).
77. 746 F. Supp. 1159 (D. Mass. 1990).
78. Id. at 1169.
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case, 79 the above-quoted language illustrates the court's presuppo-
sition that all confused individuals have confronted the plaintiff
and that all instances of confusion which have occurred have been
reported to the plaintiff and have been "cleared up." Such an
assumption is improper, and a court must be sure to distinguish
between instances of actual confusion and reported instances of
actual confusion; the latter generally being a mere subset of the
former.8 0 Indeed, in some instances it may be proper for a court to
infer that if several individuals have inquired about a possible
affiliation between the parties or their products based upon a con-
fusing similarity between their marks, several more individuals
would not bother to inquire but rather would mistakenly assume,
without question, that such a relationship does in fact exist.8"
The "better view" also fails to take into account the number of
individuals who have made affiliation inquiries. That is, under
that view, it apparently does not matter whether there have been
one or one thousand affiliation inquiries; if this is the only type of
actual confusion evidence adduced, it is insufficient to show actual
confusion. Such a rule is too rigid for courts to adopt, for if there
has been a large number of well-documented affiliation inquiries
made, and it is clear that the inquiries were made because of the
similarity between the parties' trademarks, this may very well
constitute compelling evidence that actual confusion has occurred
and is likely to continue.82
79. The other grounds stated by the court for rejecting this evidence - such
as that each inquirer was a friend or acquaintance of the plaintiffs president or
otherwise affiliated with plaintiffs band - appear to be sufficient to find that
this evidence is not incredibly probative of actual confusion. See id. at 1170.
80. Courts generally recognize the difficulty of obtaining evidence of actual
confusion. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. This difficulty should not be
ignored when evaluating the types and amount of actual confusion evidence
introduced by the plaintiff. See also Forum Corp. of North America v. Forum,
Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 443 (7th Cir. 1990) ("it does not seem reasonable to classify
appellant's [actual confusion] evidence ... as de minimis, since it was not based
on a full survey of customers. In other words, this is not a case in which we could
conclude that there was a statistically insignificant percentage of confusion,
since the actual percentage is unknown.")
81. See, e.g., Tiffany & Co. v. Classic Motor Carriages Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1835, 1843 (T.T.A.B. 1989)(where the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
justified the absence of actual confusion on the basis that "consumers might not
make inquiry because they simply assume a connection with opposer.").
82. See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 845 (9th
Cir. 1975).
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On the other hand, a court should not always necessarily con-
clude that a few affiliation inquiries prove that actual confusion
exists, for such evidence clearly is not the strongest type of actual
confusion evidence. For example, unlike with a mistaken
purchase, an inquirer does not necessarily take any action to his
detriment or inconvenience in inquiring of the parties' relation-
ship. He may simply be curious, and the opportunity to ask one of
the parties may be readily at hand.83 A court should analyze the
number of inquiries and the specific factual context in which they
arose.8 4 For example, the evidence on this point should establish
that the inquiries resulted from the similarity of the parties'
trademarks or, at the least, that there is no other logical reason
for individuals to so inquire as to a possible relationship between
the parties. If this is shown, and if there is a significant number
of "quality" inquiries, this evidence should be of value to the plain-
tiff on the actual confusion issue.
There are other decisions which concern "actual confusion"
evidence somewhat analogous to affiliation inquiry evidence, and
therefore merit discussion. In some of these cases, the plaintiffs
introduced testimony of individuals who believed, assumed or
"just wondered" if, the parties were the same or related, or their
products emanated from the same source. Some courts appar-
ently have found such evidence to be probative of actual confu-
sion,8 5 while others have given it little or no weight.8  In other
instances some courts have found that the testimony of individu-
83. But see Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 844 (11th Cir.
1983) ("the reports of confusion that do exist [three affiliation "inquiries" by
friends of plaintiff asking whether or stating that plaintiff opened up a new
skating rink] appear genuine, given that the three witnesses independently and
on their own initiative contacted [plaintiffs president] to inquire about the new
rink. Thus, this testimony alone might be sufficient to support a finding of actual
confusion.").
84. These concerns are discussed as they apply to all types of actual confusion
evidence infra at notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
85. Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 220 (5th Cir.
1985); Earth Technology Corp. v. Environmental Research & Technology, Inc.,
222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 585, 589 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Wuv's Int'l, Inc. v. Love's Enters.,
Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 736, 752-53 (D. Colo. 1980); Markel v. Scovill Mfg. Co.,
471 F. Supp. 1244, 1251 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Jockey Int'l, Inc. v. Burkard, 185
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 201, 205 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
86. Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482,
490 (1st Cir. 1981); Bridges in Organization, Inc. v. Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1827, 1836 (D. Md. 1991); Hutchinson v. Essence
Communications, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 541, 555-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Broadcasting
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als who stated they were initially confused between the parties'
marks is of some value on the issue of actual confusion. 7 While
these courts have given it some weight, such evidence should be
scrutinized carefully to determine whether the initial confusion
actually was confusion, or whether it really was an instance where
the defendant's mark merely called the plaintiff or his mark to
mind. In other words, such initial confusion evidence should illus-
trate more than trivial, momentary and passing thoughts.
D. Whose Confusion Is Relevant
Another question which courts have addressed in a variety of
ways is whose actual confusion is relevant to the likelihood of con-
fusion inquiry. Courts have uniformly credited evidence of mis-
taken purchases. Likewise, courts have not discredited other
evidence of actual confusion on the part of purchasers and other
ultimate consumers except for reasons other than the identity of
such individuals. Beyond that, however, is where the variance
lies. For example, some courts have stated that evidence on the
part of those other than purchasers or consumers is of little or no
value.8 8 On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
stated that "[i]n no case have we sanctioned total disregard of evi-
Publications, Inc. v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 309, 319 (S.D. Fla. 1983);
Jewel Cos. v. Westhall Co., 413 F. Supp. 994, 999 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
87. Transfer Print Foils, Inc. v. Transfer Print America, Inc., 720 F. Supp.
425, 430-31 (D. N.J. 1989); Central Benefits Mutual Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Ass'n, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103, 1108-10 (S.D. Ohio 1989); First
Int'l Servs. Corp. v. Chuckles, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1628, 1634 (T.T.A.B.
1988); see also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 325 (4th
Cir. 1992) (Powell, J., dissenting) (where Justice Powell considered testimony of
one of the defendants' wholesale purchasers that his "initial reaction" to the
defendants' design was that "it was a copy" of the plaintiffs shirt to be
"substantial evidence of likely confusion."). But see Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1167 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Short lived
confusion or confusion of individuals casually acquainted with a business is
worthy of little weight. .. ."); Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists,
Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1109-10 (6th Cir. 1991).
88. See, e.g., Bridges in Organizations, Inc. v. Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,
19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1827, 1836 (D. Md. 1991); American Cyanamid Co. v. S. C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (DNA) 1032, 1043-45 (D.N.J. 1989); Inc.
Publishing Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 389 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); see also supra note 36 and cases cited therein.
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dence of actual confusion; there is simply no precedent for such a
view, regardless of the identity of the person confused."8 9
Courts have considered the probativeness of evidence of
actual confusion on the part of retailers and distributors, competi-
tors and other members of the trade of which the parties are mem-
bers, suppliers, friends and acquaintances of the parties, and
advertising media as well as others, often with varying results.
Courts have been consistent, however, in finding that confusion on
the part of the alleged infringer or its employees as to the parties'
trademarks is probative of actual confusion. 90 One such court
referred to the inability of the defendant's president to distinguish
between the parties' trade dresses as "probably the best indirect
proof of actual confusion . . . . [His] inability to distinguish
between the two lamps portends the consumers' inability to do the
same."
9 1
1. Retailers and Distributors
Most courts addressing the issue have found that confusion
on the part of distributors, such as retailers, of the parties' trade-
marked products or their employees is probative evidence of
actual confusion.92 Some of these courts have found such evidence
89. Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591,
597 (5th Cir. 1985).
90. PAF S.r.l. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Marshak v. Sheppard, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829, 1838 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Armstrong Cork Co. v. Armstrong Plastic Covers Co., 434 F. Supp. 860, 868 (E.D.
Mo. 1977); Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp.
479, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
91. PAF S.r.l. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. at 409.
92. Americana Trading, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th
Cir. 1992); Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 221 (5th
Cir. 1985); Sicilia Di R Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 433 n.11 (5th Cir.
1984); Harlequin Enters. Ltd. v. Gulf& Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946, 949 (2d Cir.
1981); Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d at 605 (3d Cir. 1978); Union
Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 384; World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick
Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th Cir. 1971); Interstate
Battery System of America, Inc. v. Wright, 811 F. Supp. 237, 243 (N.D. Tex.
1993); Veryfine Prods, Inc. v. Colon Brothers, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 240, 253 (D.P.R.
1992); White Swan Ltd. v. Clyde Robin Seed Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985,
1989 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 613 F. Supp.
1052, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Steinway & Sons v. Robert Demars & Friends, 210
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 954, 966 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Waples-Platter Cos. v. General Foods
Corp. 439 F. Supp. 551, 582 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Glamorene Prods Corp. v. Boyle-
Midway, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145, 158-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Jockey Int'l, Inc.
v. Burkard, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 201, 205 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Telechron, Inc. v.
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to be "indirect" evidence of actual confusion because it is not evi-
dence of confusion on the part of the purchasing public.9" How-
ever, such generally is not the case. While such evidence does not
illustrate actual retail consumer confusion, retailers and distribu-
tors, and certain of their employees, are nonetheless consumers of
the parties' trademarked products. Moreover, as at least three
courts have noted, if professional buyers such as retailers are
actually confused by the parties' trademarks, it follows that less
knowledgeable and discriminating retail consumers are likely to
be confused.94
The Seventh Circuit's treatment of evidence of sales clerk con-
fusion in Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc.,9 illustrates
how courts could, and perhaps should, treat such evidence. In
Ever-Ready, in support of the existence of actual confusion the
plaintiff had introduced evidence, inter alia, that when plaintiffs
counsel's secretary sought to purchase EVER-READY bulbs at a
store, the sales clerk showed her the defendant's bulbs and
assured her that they were made by Union Carbide. The trial
court discounted this evidence, stating that "it is impossible to dis-
tinguish between [the sales clerk's] alleged confusion and her
desire to make a sale."96 The trial court also found suspect "actual
confusion" evidence that is manufactured by the plaintiff.97
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court, and
found that this evidence was probative of confusion irrespective of
whether the sales clerk in fact knew that the bulbs in question
were not made by Union Carbide:
Although we have great difficulty conceiving that a clerk's anxiety
to make this small-dollar sale would prompt a deliberate and
knowledgeable misrepresentation, if we assume that the clerk was
not confused, the evidence is nevertheless relevant because it is
unfair competition for a person to put a product into a dealer's
hands which a producer can reasonably anticipate may be easily
Telicon Corp., 97 F. Supp. 131, 143 (D. Del. 1951), affd, 198 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.
1952).
93. See, e.g., Ferrara v. Scharf, 466 F. Supp. 125, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Polo
Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Prods., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555, 561 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
94. Interstate Battery System of America, Inc. v. Wright, 811 F. Supp. at 243;
White Swan Ltd. v. Clyde Robin Seed Co., 12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1989; Jockey
Intl, Inc. v. Burkard, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 205.
95. 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976).
96. 392 F. Supp. 280, 291 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
97. Id.
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passed off as the goods of another. Assuming the clerk was con-
fused, this gives rise to an inference that purchasers would also be
confused because salespersons are more likely than customers to
be familiar with various marks on the merchandise they sell and
hence are less likely to be confused.9"
While this evidence was somewhat manufactured, the Seventh
Circuit nevertheless recognized its significance.
Not all courts have found sales clerk confusion to be relevant
to the issue of infringement. In contrast to the Ever-Ready deci-
sion and the other decisions cited in this section is Olay Co. v.
Coco Care Products, Inc. 99 There, the plaintiff, which manufac-
tured OIL OF OLAY skin care products, sought to have a court
enjoin the defendant's use of the term OILS & ALOE in connec-
tion with its skin care products. In trying to show actual confu-
sion, the plaintiff introduced the testimony of its representatives
and of drug store employees that drug store personnel mistakenly
believed that OILS & ALOE was a new product offered by the
plaintiff. Though the court found infringement, it gave this evi-
dence little weight:
This evidence of confusion is not particularly significant because it
is confusion on the part of the buying public that is important. A
product is viewed differently by a purchaser with money in hand
than it is by a store employee. Indeed, it is difficult to give greater
credibility to such evidence than can be obtained by a simple com-
parison of the products' packages.100
The Olay court's finding concerning this evidence is contrary to
the weight of authority and ignores the reasons such evidence is
entitled to at least some weight. First, to the extent that retail
employees are wholesale purchasers (on behalf of their employ-
ers), they are direct consumers. Second, even if they are not, they
are nevertheless members, albeit presumably more sophisticated,
of the class of consumers for the products they sell. Third, as the
Ever-Ready court pointed out, the fact that such knowledgeable,
brand-educated retail employees are confused supports an infer-
ence that less sophisticated ordinary consumers will likewise be
confused. In fact, one court has asserted that,
Confusion among clerks is in itself enough to establish infringe-
ment because it is certain that if clerks who sell a product are con-
98. Union Carbide, 531 F.2d at 384 (citations omitted).
99. 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
100. Id. at 1039 (citations omitted).
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fused to the point of selling one article for another such is evidence
of the probability of confusion by customers. 10 '
2. Suppliers, Competitors and Members of the Trade
Based upon the third reason stated in the preceding para-
graph, most courts have found evidence of actual confusion on the
part of the parties' competitors or other members of the parties'
trade or industry to be relevant and probative, though indirect,
evidence of actual confusion. 10 2 At least one court, however, has
rejected such evidence on the ground that the mistaken impres-
sions of such individuals - in that case a fashion professional -
"cannot reasonably be said to reflect that of the average con-
sumer." 03 Confusion on the part of suppliers of goods or services
to the parties may be probative indirect evidence of actual
confusion.
10 4
3. The Media, Advertisers and Others
Courts have generally been willing to credit as relevant to the
actual confusion issue evidence that members of the media in
magazine or newspaper articles confused the parties' products or
services. 10 5 In most of these cases, the media confusion was not
101. Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 97 F. Supp. 131, 143 (3d Cir. 1952)
(quotation omitted). Accord Interstate Battery System of America, Inc. v.
Wright, 811 F. Supp. 237, 243 (N.D. Tex. 1993) ("[T]he fact that these retailers
were confused regarding genuine and mislabeled batteries is highly probative of
likelihood of confusion in the marketplace generally because retailers are less
likely to be confused than average consumers.").
102. See, e.g., Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 220-21
(5th Cir. 1985); Citibank, N.A. v. City Bank, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 997, 1009 (N.D.
Cal. 1980); Santucci Constr. Co. v. Carlo V. Santucci, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
783, 786 (N.D. Ila. 1978) (confusion by publishers of trade journal); Jonbil Inc. v.
International Multifoods Corp., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1882, 1885-86 (T.T.A.B.
1987). But see Windsor, Inc. v. Intravco Travel Centers, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1513,
1524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (where court stated that one instance of alleged actual
confusion on the part of another supplier in the parties' industry was, inter alia,
irrelevant, since "plaintiff must prove that an appreciable number of reasonable
consumers - rather than suppliers or retailers - would be confused. .. ").
103. Brown v. Quiniou, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
See also Windsor, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1513, 1524-25.
104. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d
1160, 1167 (11th Cir. 1982); Purofied Down Prods. Corp. v. Puro Down Int'l, 530
F. Supp. 134, 135 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
105. See, e.g., Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Creative house
Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1991); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit
Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 522 (10th Cir. 1987); Schering Corp. v. Schering A.G., 4
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the sole type of actual confusion introduced by the plaintiff or
relied upon by the court in finding actual confusion. However, in
Pro Hardware, Inc. v. Home Centers of America, Inc. ,106 the court
discounted other evidence proffered on this point and relied solely
on one instance of media confusion in finding that the actual con-
fusion factor had been satisfied:
The Court considers persuasive of actual confusion, however, the
fact that a neutral reporter from the Corpus Christi Caller-Times
in a newspaper article about this dispute confused the two names.
The Court finds that there has been actual confusion of the
names. 107
Courts have also given weight to evidence illustrating that a
defendant's advertising agency or its representatives or advertis-
ters in the plaintiff's publication, were confused by the parties'
trademarks. 0 8
One court has found that evidence of actual confusion as to
the parties' marks on the part of an insurance investigator sup-
ported a finding of actual confusion. 10 9 Another court found evi-
dence that local Better Business Bureau organizations
erroneously directed complaints about plaintiffs products to
defendants constituted actual confusion." 0
4. Friends and Acquaintances of the Senior User
A few courts have also considered whether confusion among
friends, relatives or acquaintances of the senior user constitutes
credible, probative actual confusion evidence. The courts in two
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1604 (D.N.J. 1987); Pro Hardware, Inc. v. Home Centers
of America, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 146, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1984); Koppers Co. v. Krupp-
Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Santucci Constr. Co. v.
Carlo V. Santucci, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 783, 786 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Stembridge
Prods., Inc. v. Gay, 335 F. Supp. 863, 866 (M.D. Ga. 1971). But see Centaur
Communications Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1227 (2d
Cir. 1987).
106. 607 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
107. Id. at 152.
108. See, e.g., Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 605 (3d Cir. 1978);
Multi-Local Media, Inc. v. 800 Yellow Book Inc., 813 F. Supp. 199, 204 (E.D.N.Y.
1993); Armstrong Cork Co. v. Armstrong Plastic Covers Co., 434 F. Supp. 860,
868 (E.D. Mo. 1977); Chester Barrie, Ltd. v. Chester Laurie, Ltd., 189 F. Supp.
98, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
109. Quill Corp. v. Quill Printing Corp., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 986, 988 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
110. Armstrong Cork Co. v. Armstrong Plastic Covers Co., 434 F. Supp. 860,
868 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
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decisions did not discount the evidence of actual confusion exper-
ienced by the plaintiffs acquaintances. 1 ' In one of the decisions,
the Eleventh Circuit noted that these "reports of confusion that do
exist appear genuine, given that the three [acquaintances] inde-
pendently and on their own initiative contacted [the plaintiffs
principal shareholder] to inquire about the new rink."112 On the
other hand, in three other decisions, two of which were from the
same two courts, little weight was given to evidence of actual con-
fusion of the plaintiffs friends or relatives where there was no
showing that these individuals were customers or potential cus-
tomers of the parties. 113 Another court, addressing the plaintiffs
counsel's statement that he was confused by the parties' trade
dresses - the only actual confusion "evidence" proffered by the
plaintiff - wisely found that such a statement "can be accorded
only limited probative value because of the party's obvious alle-
giance to plaintiff."114
E. Putting It Into Context - The Quantum of Actual Confusion
Evidence Required
Not only must courts decide what evidence constitutes "good"
evidence of actual confusion, they must also decide how much evi-
dence of actual confusion is required to establish this factor in the
plaintiffs favor. As with the former issue, the analyse engaged in
by courts to determine the latter issue have varied widely. Not
surprisingly, the debate on this issue most often arises in cases
where the plaintiff has presented only a relatively small number
of instances of actual confusion.
Some courts have held that evidence of a few instances of
actual confusion established this factor in the senior user's
favor," 5 often relying specifically upon the rule that since actual
111. Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 844 (11th Cir. 1983),
affg 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170, 177 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar
Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1982).
112. Jellibeans, 716 F.2d at 844.
113. W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 574 (2d Cir.
1993); Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d at 1185, affg 583 F. Supp.
544, 548 (M.D. Fla. 1984); Sun Banks, Inc. v. Sun Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 651
F.2d 311, 319 (5th Cir. 1981).
114. Warner Lambert Co. v. McCrory's Corp., 718 F. Supp. 389, 399 (D.N.J.
1989).
115. See, e.g., Louisiana World Exposition, Inc. v. Logue, 746 F.2d 1033, 1041
(5th Cir. 1984); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d
1160, 1166-67 (11th Cir. 1982); Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, Inc., 716 F.2d
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confusion evidence is difficult to obtain, even a small number of
instances is significant. 116 Some courts also have relied upon the
facts that the goods involved are lower-priced items and, there-
fore, consumers are less likely to make their confusion known. 1 7
Other courts, however, have dismissed the plaintiffs evidence of a
few actual confusion instances as de minimis, without further
analyzing the issue."' Still other courts have similarly found that
the plaintiffs proffered instances of actual confusion were insuffi-
cient to establish this factor, but have based their decisions on a
comparison of the number of instances submitted to the amount of
opportunity for consumers to experience actual confusion. 119
833, 843-45 (11th Cir. 1983); Rota-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 46 (5th
Cir. 1975); Varitronics Sys., Inc. v. Merlin Equip., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1203, 1208-
09 (S.D. Fla. 1988); IMS, Ltd. v. International Medical Sys., Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1268, 1275 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Olay Co. v. Cococare Prods., Inc., 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1028, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); American Ass'n for the
Advancement of Science v. Hearst Corp., 498 F. Supp. 244, 258-59 (D.D.C. 1980);
MRI Sys. Corp. v. Wesley-Jessen, Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 214, 220 (T.T.A.B.
1975); Molenaar, Inc. v. Happy Toys, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 469, 471 (T.T.A.B.
1975).
116. Id. See also supra notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spirit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 522 (10th Cir.
1987); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1544 (11th Cir. 1986); see also
Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383 (7th Cir. 1976).
118. Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100,
1107 (6th Cir. 1991); American Int'l Group v. American Int'l Airways, Inc., 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933, 1936 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Information Clearing House, Inc.
v. Find Magazine, 492 F. Supp. 147, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); B.D. Communications,
Inc. v. Dial Media, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Contra
Forum Corp. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 443 (7th Cir. 1990).
119. See, e.g., Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 606-07
(9th Cir. 1987) (evidence of actual confusion was insignificant in view of both
parties' high volume of business); Sun Banks, Inc. v. Sun Fed. Say. and Loan
Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311, 319 (5th Cir. 1981) (several isolated instances of actual
confusion were negligible "in light of the number of transactions conducted and
the extent of the parties' advertising"); Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615
F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980) (three instances of actual confusion over 15 years of
extensive concurrent sales found insignificant); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid
Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1231 (3d Cir. 1978) (nineteen misdirected letters in
four-year period during which defendant sold 50 million cans of its product found
to be insufficient); DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499,
514-15 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976) (six weak instances of
confusion over eleven years is either no evidence or minimal evidence of actual
confusion); Clinton Detergent Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 133 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
520, 522-23 (C.C.P.A. 1962); Bayshore Group Ltd. v. Bay Shore Seafood Brokers,
Inc., 762 F. Supp. 404, 413 (D. Mass. 1991); Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1435, 1440 (D. Kan. 1990) (ten
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Yet other courts have either discounted or expressed reserva-
tions regarding the significance of actual confusion evidence in
light of the plaintiffs failure to introduce evidence which would
allow the courts to compare the number of instances to the
amount of the parties' sales activities. For example, in Mile High
Upholstery Fabric Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co. 120, the court
analyzed this very issue, and stated,
Although plaintiff has offered evidence of several instances of
actual confusion by the consuming public, it has made no effort to
place those instances in perspective. We have no idea whatsoever
of the weight to be given the recounted incidents in comparison
with plaintiffs total sales activity.... [Pilaintiff's failure to indi-
cate in any way the weight to be given to its evidence of actual
confusion detracts significantly from its showing. 12 1
With the exception of the Mile High decision and those in
accord with it, the decisions discussed above illustrate that most
courts apparently have experienced little difficulty in determining
- often with little or no discussion or analysis - that the number
of actual confusion incidents either were significant and therefore
probative of confusion, or were de minimis and therefore could be
disregarded. The apparent ease with which these courts have
been able to resolve this issue is surprising; it would be difficult
instances of actual confusion found to be "numerically insignificant"); Official
Airline Guides, Inc. v. Churchfield Publications, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897,
1904 (D. Or. 1990) (seven misdirected mailings in a period when 600,000
mailings were made was de minimis and did not establish actual confusion);
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Ins. Co., 657 F. Supp. 1307, 1317 (M.D. La.
1985), affd without opinion, 791 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1986); Inc. Publishing Corp.
v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); American
Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220, 1231 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), affd, 580 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1978); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs.
Corp., 182 F. Supp. 350, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), affd on other grounds, 287 F.2d
492 (2d Cir. 1961) (the less than 100 instances of misdirected mail were "an
insignificant fraction of the mail received by the plaintiff and the defendant.");
Anica Mut. Ins. Co. v. R.H. Cosmetics Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 155, 163-64
(T.T.A.B. 1979) (ten misdirected letters over a five-year period during which
opposer received approximately one million pieces of mail found to be
"inconsequential, insignificant, and of no legal consequence."); Transamerica Fin.
Corp. v. Trans-American Collections, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 43, 52 (T.T.A.B.
1977). But see Forum Corp. v. Forum, Ltd, 903 F.2d at 443.
120. 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 217 (N.D. 111. 1983).
121. Id. at 223 (citation omitted). Accord Imperial Serv. Sys., Inc. v. ISS Intl
Serv. Sys., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 655, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Source Serv. Corp. v.
Source Telecomputing Corp., 635 F. Supp. 600, 614 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
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enough to determine how much evidence of actual confusion must
be proven if all such evidence were equally probative and credible,
but this issue is made even more difficult in view of the types of
actual confusion evidence and the varying probative values which
courts have given them.
Some courts have specifically recognized the difficulty of
"quantifying" actual confusion evidence to determine whether or
not a plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to establish the
actual confusion factor in its favor. For example, in Forum Corpo-
ration of North America v. Forum, Ltd. 122, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the district court's characterization of
the plaintiffs actual confusion evidence as being de minimis. In
finding the district court erred by discounting the plaintiffs evi-
dence of actual confusion, the Seventh Circuit stated,
it does not seem reasonable to classify [the plaintiffs actual confu-
sion] evidence ... as de minimis, since it was not based on a full
survey of customers. In other words, this is not a case in which we
would conclude that there was a statistically insignificant percent-
age of confusion, since the actual percentage is unknown.' 23
The court implicitly recognized one major difficulty of quantifying
actual confusion evidence - that a plaintiff generally is unable to
produce evidence of all 'instances of actual confusion but rather
can only introduce evidence of those instances brought to his
attention.
In Lambda Electronics Corp. v. Lambda Technology, Inc.124 ,
Judge Ward acknowledged a court's inability to categorize easily
the amount of actual confusion and the consequences that follow
therefrom:
The difficult question for the Court is not to decide whether the
factor of actual confusion is present here, but rather to assess how
significantly that factor is implicated by the facts of the case. This
requires consideration of the magnitude of the actual confusion
proven by Veeco. Veeco argues that the actual confusion in this
case is "rampant"; Lambda Technology styles this actual confusion
as being "de minimis." The truth lies somewhere between these
two extremes. Lambda Technology persuasively points out that it
receives numerous checks and orders from those companies that
sent the half-dozen or so misdirected checks, and that its market-
ing representatives come in contact with thousands of potential or
122. 903 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1990).
123. Id. at 443.
124. 515 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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existing customers each year, making the reported instances of
confusion much less striking than they appear on their face. On
the other hand, Veeco soundly argues that the recorded instances
of actual confusion should be magnified by virtue of the general
inaccessibility of such information, and also of the relatively brief
period within which it occurred in this case. Plainly there is no
analytical mechanism for determining that actual confusion is sig-
nificant in one case, rampant in a second, and de minimis in a
third. The trial judge must rely upon his own common sense
rather than upon any well-articulated legal principle in such cases
... [T]he Court holds that there was appreciable actual confusion
in this case, meaning that this particular likelihood of confusion
factor is not only present here, but significantly implicated. At the
same time, the Court does not view this actual confusion to be
"rampant" in the manner suggested by plaintiffs. The Court
accordingly declines plaintiffs' invitation to consider this actual
confusion not only in its own right as a factor probative of likeli-
hood of confusion, but also as probative of whether certain of the
other Polaroid factors are implicated in this case. In the Court's
view, to allow the evidence of actual confusion to play this dual
role here would be to give this evidence more probative weight
than it may justifiably be said to deserve. 125
Judge Ward's language illustrates the potential dilemma which
courts face in assessing the amount of actual confusion needed in
order for this factor to weigh in favor of a likelihood of confusion
and, if it does, the extent to which it does. There is no articulable
formula which courts can utilize in answering this question. Nev-
ertheless, in attempting to resolve this issue courts should con-
sider (1) the type and number of actual confusion instances
presented by the plaintiff; (2) the extent to which opportunities
exist for actual confusion to occur; and (3) the extent to which
opportunities exist for the plaintiff to learn of instances of actual
confusion.
F. Survey Evidence and Expert Opinions as Evidence of Actual
Confusion
Many courts have considered a properly conducted likelihood
of confusion market survey to be probative evidence of actual con-
fusion.126 There is no question that a properly conducted market
125. Id. at 927 (emphasis added).
126. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1293
(9th Cir. 1992); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.
1987); Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d
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survey indicating that a substantial percentage of respondents
confuse the two trademarks in question is relevant to, probative
of, and supports a finding of, a likelihood of confusion. 127 How-
ever, survey evidence is not actual confusion in fact, and it is ques-
tionable whether courts should consider it as such. Survey results
do not constitute instances of actual confusion, for they do not rep-
resent incidents of actual consumers who have experienced actual
confusion in the "real" marketplace.
One court has considered whether expert opinion testimony
that the public is "being misled" by the defendant's use of a simi-
lar mark constitutes probative actual confusion evidence, and
properly held that it was "not competent, admissible evidence of
actual confusion. "128
G. Evidence of Non-Confused Consumers
A few courts have also considered the value to be given to evi-
dence introduced by trademark infringement defendants that cer-
tain consumers or other individuals were not confused when
confronted with the parties' marks. At least two courts have given
such evidence at least some weight. 129 In two others, however, the
1217, 1227; Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1487
(10th Cir. 1987); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1544 n.68 (11th Cir.
1986); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d
Cir. 1986); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir.
1985); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1330-
31 (7th Cir. 1977); Gilbert/Robinson v. Carrie Beverage-Missouri, 758 F. Supp.
512, 524 (E.D. Mo. 1991); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 724 F. Supp. 808, 816 (D. Kan. 1989); ("Evidence of actual confusion can
consist of customer inquiries and public recognition surveys; the latter being
more persuasive than the former."); Inc. Publishing Corp. v. Manhattan
Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 386, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Mushroom Makers,
Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 580 F.2d
44 (2d Cir. 1978).
127. See generally 2 McCARTHY, supra note 11, at §§ 32.46 to 32.55. A general
discussion of survey evidence is beyond the scope of this article.
128. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 724 F. Supp.
808, 816 (D. Kan. 1989). Other courts have properly concluded that such opinion
testimony regarding the likelihood of confusion between the marks in question is
entitled to little or no weight. See, e.g., John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks,
Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 979 n.23 (11th Cir. 1983); American Meat Inst. v. Horace W.
Longacre, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 712, 720-21 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
129. Wordsmith Publ. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1248-1249 (8th
Cir. 1990); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Churchfield Publications, Inc., 17
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1904 (D. Or. 1990). See also Hutchinson v. Essence
Communications, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 541, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[O]n the other
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courts said such evidence is not helpful in determining the actual
confusion issue and should be disregarded.' ° The courts in these
latter decisions take the proper view. As one of those courts
stated,
[The defendant] offered the testimony of several consumers who
testified that they had not been confused. The district court prop-
erly disregarded this evidence. If [the defendant] could not find at
least a handful of consumers who would agree to testify that they
had not been confused, it might as well have defaulted. 13 1
III. EVIDENTIARY CONCERNS INVOLVING AcTuAL CoNFusIoN
Courts have also addressed a number of evidentiary issues
relating to actual confusion. These issues range from admissibil-
ity concerns, focusing primarily on the issue of whether the actual
confusion sought to be introduced constituted inadmissible hear-
say evidence, to concerns regarding the form of the actual confu-
sion evidence and whether the defendant's counsel had the
opportunity to examine the confused consumers.
Many courts have addressed the issue of whether certain evi-
dence of actual confusion constitutes inadmissible hearsay evi-
dence. Usually, the evidence objected to on this basis has been in
the form of testimony by the recipient of the statements of the con-
fused consumer regarding the substance or the nature of the
statements made. Courts which have addressed this issue have
found that such evidence is admissible because it either falls
within the Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) "state of mind" excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, or because the evidence is not being
offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted" (Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(c)), or both.1 3 2 Of course, depending on its form and
side of the equation, Hutchinson testified that no one asked her whether she
worked with or was associated with ESSENCE magazine in any way. I found
Hutchinson to be a credible witness and accept that testimony.").
130. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d at 1544 n.69; Earth Technology Corp.
v. Environmental Research & Technology, Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 585, 589
(C.D. Cal. 1983); Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Cassini Tailors, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1104,
1112 (W.D. Tex. 1990) ("That certain individuals are not confused does not
convince the Court that other consumers will not be confused. .. ").
131. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1544 (11th Cir. 1986).
132. See, e.g., Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1487
n.1 (affiliation inquiry evidence admissible pursuant to state of mind exception);
Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155; 1160 n.10 (5th Cir.
1982) (inquiry evidence admissible based upon state of mind exception and
because such evidence was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted);
[Vol. 16:19
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substance, actual confusion evidence may well constitute inadmis-
sible hearsay, and courts have rejected such evidence where plain-
tiffs have failed to establish a proper basis for admissibility. 133
Given the important role actual confusion evidence can play in the
outcome of the case, trademark infringement plaintiffs should be
prepared to address questions of admissibility of the actual confu-
sion evidence which they intend to proffer. Likewise, defendants
should no doubt challenge the admissibility of such evidence
where no proper basis for its admission appears to exist.
Courts also have grappled with the difficult issue of the
weight to be given to evidence of actual confusion where there is
no opportunity either to substantiate or to challenge such evi-
dence. More specifically, some courts have questioned the weight
to be given to actual confusion evidence where the defendant is
not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the allegedly con-
fused individuals. Such a problem has arisen where the evidence
of actual confusion is presented through the testimony of the
Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 761 n.13 (2d
Cir. 1960) (evidence admissible based upon state of mind exception); Imperial
Serv. Sys., Inc. v. ISS Intl Serv. Sys., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 655, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(evidence admissible based upon state of mind exception); Source Servs. Corp. v.
Source Telecomputing Corp., 635 F. Supp. 600, 612 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (certain
evidence of actual confusion admissible pursuant to state of mind exception); Inc.
Publishing Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 388 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (inquiry evidence admissible pursuant to state of mind exception and
because an inquiry is not an "assertion" and, accordingly, cannot be a hearsay
statement); Mustang Motels, Inc. v. Patel, 226 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 526, 527 n.1 (E.D.
Cal. 1985) (actual confusion evidence admissible because such evidence was not
being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted); Mile High Upholstery
Fabric Co. v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 217, 222-223
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (actual confusion evidence admissible because it is not offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted and falls within the state of mind
exception); American Orthodontics Corp. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 531 F.
Supp. 247, 250 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (actual confusion evidence admissible pursuant to
present sense impression and state of mind exceptions to the hearsay rule); Toys
"R" Us, Inc. v. Lamps Are Us, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 340, 345-46 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
133. See, e.g., Vitek Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 675 F.2d 190, 194 (8th Cir.
1982); Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp.
1546, 1558-61 (S.D. Fla. 1990); McKee Baking Co. v. Interstate Brands Corp., 17
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1528, 1529 (E.D. Mo. 1990); Pro Hardware, Inc. v. Home Ctrs.
of Am., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 146, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1984); Programmed Tax Sys., Inc. v.
Raytheon Co., 439 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see Kusan, Inc.
v. Fairway Siding Corp., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1202, 1209 (D. Mass. 1988) (where
court ruled that affiliation inquiry evidence was inadmissible hearsay, without
mention of the state of mind exception whether the inquiries were assertions or
were offered for proving the truth of the matter asserted.).
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recipient of statements illustrating confusion on the part of those
making the statements, and where (usually in the context of a pre-
liminary injunction hearing), affidavits concerning actual confu-
sion are proffered instead of live testimony. Courts have varied in
their assessment of such evidence; some have taken the position
that the inability for either substantiation or cross-examination
warrants heavily discounting the probative value of such evi-
dence,' while others have given such evidence substantial
weight despite these concerns. 135 In the context of a motion for a
preliminary injunction, another court admitted and relied upon
affidavit testimony of actual confusion where the opposing party
had an opportunity to conduct depositions of the affiants who had
reported instances of actual confusion, but failed to do so.
136
Such a variance is to be expected, and should not be construed
as illustrating an unnecessary inconsistency in rulings by the
courts. The courts probably have implicitly focused, and in fact
should focus, on whether the plaintiff has submitted its evidence
of actual confusion in the best, most complete manner possible.
For example, courts should consider the reason the alleged con-
fused individuals did not testify at trial. If legitimate reasons
exist, such a failure should not necessarily result in giving the
actual confusion evidence little or no weight. On the other hand, if
through reasonable efforts the plaintiff could have obtained testi-
mony directly from the allegedly confused individuals, thus
allowing the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine them, a
failure to produce such witnesses should raise serious questions as
to the weight to be afforded to such evidence.
134. See, e.g., Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., 481 F.2d 445, 448-49
(5th Cir. 1973); Hutchinson v. Essence Communications, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 541,
555 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Bridges in Orgs., Inc. v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc., 19
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1827, 1836 (D. Md. 1991); Warner Lambert Co. v. McCrory's
Corp., 718 F. Supp. 389, 399 (D.N.J. 1989); Lobo Enters., Inc. v. Tunnel, Inc., 693
F. Supp. 71, 74-75, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Victory Pipe Craftsman, Inc. v. Faberge,
Inc., 582 F. Supp. 551, 558 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Freedom Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Way,
583 F. Supp. 544, 548 (M.D. Fla. 1984), affd, 757 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir. 1985);
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Berry Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220, 1231 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), affd, 580 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978); Transamerica Fin. Corp. v. Trans-
American Collections, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 43, 51-2 (T.T.A.B. 1977).
135. See, e.g., International Kennel Club, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d
1079, 1090 (7th Cir. 1988); Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. v. National Dev. Group, Inc.,
No. 89-0612-Z, 1992 WL 55465, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 6, 1992); see also generally
the decisions cited supra at note 132.
136. Home Shopping Club, Inc. v. Charles of the Ritz Group, Inc., 820 F. Supp.
763, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Actual confusion evidence, where present, can play a crucial
role in the outcome of federal trademark infringement litigation.
In certain situations, courts have held that the absence of actual
confusion evidence can likewise play a pivotal role in the outcome
of such litigation, in that the absence of actual confusion evidence
over a long period of time illustrates that future confusion
between the marks involved is unlikely. Not only can credible,
probative evidence of actual confusion support the finding of a
likelihood of confusion, such evidence also indicates that the plain-
tiffs trademark has acquired secondary meaning.
There are several types of evidence which parties have prof-
fered in an attempt to prove the existence of actual confusion,
including such evidence as mistaken purchases, products returned
to the wrong party for refund or repair, consumer complaints
made to the wrong party, misdirected correspondence and tele-
phone calls, inquiries regarding a possible relationship or affilia-
tion between the parties, and survey evidence. Moreover, such
evidence has been proffered as it relates not only to consumers,
but also as to suppliers, competitors, other members of the trade,
the media, advertisers and even acquaintances of one of the par-
ties who may be familiar with the two marks. Given that evidence
purporting to prove the existence of actual confusion has taken
many forms and has involved many different classes of individu-
als, it is not surprising that decisions involving the probative
value of such evidence provide a full spectrum of interpretation of
the various types of evidence. As a result, a party on either side of
a federal trademark infringement suit can generally find some
case law supporting its position with respect to almost every type
of actual confusion evidence. The lone exception may be clear evi-
dence of instances where consumers have purchased the product
of one party under the mistaken belief that they were purchasing
the product of the other party. Courts have uniformly accepted
such evidence as probative of the existence of actual confusion.
The judicial variance in the treatment of other types of actual
confusion evidence is not necessarily the result of improper court
rulings. Rather, often the divergence may be more accurately
explained as resulting from two factors. First, determining
whether actual confusion exists in a given case is very much a
fact-intensive inquiry. Second, in many instances courts are
forced to speculate as to the precise cause of the resulting "confu-
sion," either because parties fail to provide evidence regarding the
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reason for the manifestation of alleged confusion or because such
evidence is unavailable. That is, often courts are presented only
with the result of the purported actual confusion without being
presented with direct evidence of the cause of such confusion. As
discussed in this article, some types of purported actual confusion
evidence require more explanation as to their cause than do
others.
Parties involved in trademark infringement litigation must
be mindful of the various types of evidence which courts have
found to be probative of actual confusion, and the weight accorded
to each such type. Such parties also must recognize the value of
providing the court with at least some evidence illustrating that
the manifestation of actual confusion was, in fact, caused by con-
fusion on the part of the relevant party with respect to the trade-
marks involved in suit. The more that a party can explain the
evidence as being truly the result of actual confusion, the less
likely a court is to dismiss such evidence as being utterly without
value on this issue. Parties and courts alike should therefore be
sensitive to the need to consider thoughtfully proffered evidence of
actual confusion in order to determine properly the credibility and
probativeness of such evidence; given its potential importance
such evidence should neither be blindly accepted nor rejected
when determining whether actual confusion, as well as the likeli-
hood of confusion, exists.
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